Right to Counsel and the Serviceman by R.J.F. & R.L.W.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 2 Article 5 
1966 
Right to Counsel and the Serviceman 
R.J.F. 
R.L.W. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
R.J.F. & R.L.W., Right to Counsel and the Serviceman, 15 Cath. U. L. Rev. 203 (1966). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss2/5 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
Comment/ Right to Counsel and the Serviceman
never have we held that all
the rights covered by the Fifth and
the Sixth Amendments were abrogated
by Art. 1, §8, cl. 14 of the Con-
stitution, empowering Congress to
make rules for the armed forces."'
THE ARGUMENT that the men and women of the Armed Services are to be
afforded the constitutional safeguards guaranteed to all citizens by the Bill
of Rights has been made on historical, judicial, and legislative fronts. Per-
haps the argument is academic, for regardless of whether Congress, in exer-
cising its power to regulate the military services, is or is not limited by the
Bill of Rights, it is more than clear that all concerned with military justice
have been successful in their efforts to assure military personnel basic pro-
tections of a civilized society-whether by legislative enactment, judicial de-
cree, or administrative practice.
Yet, it is unclear whether the protection of assistance of counsel for mili-
tary personnel has its foundation in the sixth amendment "right to assist-
ance of counsel."'2 Two recent federal district court opinions3 and legislation
4
pending in Congress raise anew certain questions: Does the constitutional
"right to assistance of counsel" apply to military tribunals? If this right does
apply, is legal counsel required or will military counsel suffice? Finally, will
practical considerations permit effective application of the right?
Before attempting to resolve the questions, a discussion of the two cases
and pending legislation, in view of the history and judicial and legislative
activities relating to right to counsel for servicemen, is desirable.
JUDICIAL AcTivrry
Any analysis of right to counsel in relation to military tribunals must be
made with respect to the broader consideration of whether the Founding
Fathers understood the power of Congress to make "rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces" 5 to be limited by the pro-
' Mr. Justice Douglas, in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 152 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
'U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8 Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965); LeBallister v. Warden, 247 F.
Supp. 349 (D. Kans. 1965).
'S. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
'U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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tections guaranteed all citizens through the Bill of Rights. The only ex-
press limitation in the Bill of Rights is that servicemen, unlike civilians, are
not entitled to a grand jury indictment. 6 The absence of any distinction be-
tween servicemen and civilians concerning the right to counsel has necessi-
tated inquiry into the intentions of the Founding Fathers and examination
of the practices prevalent in military tribunals at the time the Bill of Rights
was adopted.
An eloquent plea has been made that the original understanding was that
the sixth amendment applied to military tribunals.7 However, the stronger
historical case s demonstrates that the early Congresses and some of the prin-
cipal draftsmen of the Bill of Rights did not consider the Bill applicable to
military personnel 9 and that the sixth amendment right to counsel "was nev-
er thought or intended or considered, by those who drafted the sixth amend-
ment or by those who lived contemporaneously with its adoption, to apply
to prosecutions before courts martial." 10
The historical debate as to the extent of Congress' power or any limita-
0 U.S. CONSr. amend. V.
Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HAnv.
L. REv. 293 (1957).
' Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice (pts. 1-2), 72 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 266 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Wiener I and Wiener II). Mr. Wiener's article was
a rebuttal of Mr. Henderson's historical examination and conclusion.
"The 1806 Articles of War, the first comprehensive code enacted for the army under the
constitution, limited a soldier's exercise of free speech. This included, among other specific
limitations, the use of "contemptuous or disrespectful words" in reference to the President,
Vice-President or Congress of the United States. Act of April 10, 1806, ch. 20, art. 5, 2 Stat.
359, 360 (hereinafter referred to as the 1806 Articles of War). This article was signed into
law by President Jefferson, who, a few years earlier, had led a first amendment attack on
similar free speech prohibitions which were applied to civilians by the Sedition Act of 1789.
Act of July 14, 1789, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 596.
10Wiener I at 49. The 1806 Articles of War contained no specific provision for defense
counsel for an accused before a military tribunal. Article 69, 2 Stat. 359, 367-368, provided
that the presiding judge advocate at a court-martial should prosecute for the United States
and also, in a limited sense, act as counsel for the accused after he pleaded, i.e., the judge
advocate could object to leading questions asked of witnesses or incriminating questions of
the defendant. In early practice, professional lawyers were not permitted to interfere in
courts-martial proceedings by pleading or argument of any kind. A serviceman, however,
was permitted to receive informal advice or assistance from counsel. See Wiener I at 22-24.
The circumstances of one of the earliest court-martial trials, indicating that the principal
draftsman of the Bill of Rights, James Madison, did not consider the sixth amendment right
to counsel applicable to military tribunals, are recounted in Wiener I at 29-31. When Briga-
dier General William Hull was tried in 1814 for having surrendered Detroit to the enemy in
the war of 1812 without firing a shot, he requested that his legal advisers be permitted to
address the court and examine witnesses:
I appeal to the constitution of our country; and if you do not find my claim sanctioned
by the letter of that instrument, I am sure you will by its spirit, which I know must
govern the deliberations and decisions of this honourable court .... when it was pro-
vided that the accused should have the benefit of counsel, how can it be supposed that
it was intended to confine this provision to accusations before a civil court.
The court-martial ruled that counsel could not address the court personally and sentenced
the General to death with a recommendation of clemency. Under contemporary procedure
the decision was reviewed by President Madison, who approved the sentence.
[Vol. XV
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tions on this power notwithstanding, the Constitution clearly vests in Con-
gress the power to control and regulate the military establishment." At an
early date, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress' power to provide
for administration of discipline in the Armed Services by means of military
tribunals was entirely independent of and had no connection with its power
to establish civilian courts under article 111.12 This separation of civilian
and military courts was essential, for
if it were otherwise, the civil courts would virtually administer the rules and
articles, irrespectively of those to whom that duty and obligation has been con-
fided by the laws of the United States, from whose decisions no appeal or juris-
diction of any kind has been given to the civil magistrate or civil courts.'3
However, the Court added that
if a court-martial has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the charge ....
or shall inflict a punishment forbidden by the law, through its sentence shall
be approved by the officers having a revisory power of it, civil courts may, on an
action by a party aggrieved by it, inquire into the want of the court's jurisdictio _,
and give him redress. (Emphasis in the original.)14
Though Congress could and did provide for courts-martial and disciplin-
ary tribunals, 15 article III courts were not completely precluded from re-
viewing courts-martial proceedings, and a convicted serviceman, by means
of a writ of habeas corpus, could, in a civilian court, collaterally attack the
jurisdiction of the court-martial rendering his conviction.' 6 The civilian
court's inquiry was originally limited to the considerations of whether the
court-martial had been properly constituted, had jurisdiction over the accused
"The War Powers of Congress are contained in U.S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14.
1 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857).
'5 Id. at 82.
14d. at 82-83.
15See, e.g., Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 24, arts. 47-48, 1 Stat. 709, 713; Act of April 23, 1800,
ch. 33, § 1, arts. 33-41, 2 Stat. 45, 50-51; and see generally 1806 Articles of War, 2 Stat. 359.
1IEx parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879). This was the first habeas corpus proceeding before
the Supreme Court growing out of a court-martial conviction of a soldier. The Court had
previously dealt with habeas corpus applications in the cases of military commission prisoners
who were civilians. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) and Ex parte Yerger, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868). The Court had earlier held that it lacked jurisdiction to review by
certiorari the proceedings of a military commission. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
243 (1863). In Reed, the Court stated that "a writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to per-
form the function of a writ of error. To warrant the discharge of the petitioner, the sentence
under which he is held must be, not merely erroneous and voidable, but absolutely void."
Ex parte Reed, supra at 23. This position was reaffirmed in 1902 when the Court approved
the "salutary rule that the sentences of courts-martial, when affirmed by the military tribunal
of last resort, cannot be revised by the civil courts save only when void because of an absolute
want of power, and not merely voidable because of the defective exercise of power possessed."
Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 401 (1902). See generally Wurfel, Military Habeas
Corpus: 1, 49 MIcH. L. REv. 493, 515-519 (1951).
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and the charge, imposed a sentence within its power, and afforded the accused
the military appellate review granted by statute.1 7
The civilian court's collateral review then expanded into a concept of di-
vestiture of jurisdiction whereby, upon a realization that justice was not
served in a court-martial proceeding, a civilian court could rule, upon a
habeas corpus application, that a series of errors at trial divested the court-
martial of the jurisdiction possessed at the initiation of the proceedings.' 8
This expansion of the review of military convictions by civilian courts paral-
leled the expansion of review of civilian habeas corpus applications.' 9
In 1953, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the position to be taken
by a federal court when it undertakes a habeas corpus review of a military
conviction.20 Still recognizing military law as separate and distinct,21 the
Court stated that military courts have a responsibility to protect the consti-
tutional rights of an accused. 22 The Court concluded that, though Congress
17 See Note, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 COLUM. L. Rxv.
127, 130 n.33 (1964). This traditional view was thought to be positively reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in 1950. See Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950). But see Burns v. Wilson,
supra note 1, discussed infra.
28 This approach was first used by a federal court in Schita v. King, 133 F.2d 283 (8th Cir.
1943), denial of writ on remand upheld sub nom. Schita v. Cox, 139 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 761 (1944). In this case, the petitioner complained that he had been
denied a fair and impartial trial by the sentencing court-martial, including the allegation
that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at the court-martial trial. The court
stated that the accused's allegations, if uncontroverted, resulted in a denial of due process
and rendered the tribunal without jurisdiction to impose sentence and conviction.
The most cogent statement of the new approach appeared in United States ex rel. Innes
v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944). After asserting its power to grant the relief sought on
review of a court-martial conviction for constitutional due process deficiencies, the court
denied the writ, but stated that the "basic guarantee of fairness afforded by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment applies to a defendant in criminal proceedings in a federal
military court as well as in a federal civil court.... As to them [military defendants before
court-martials] due process of law means the application of the procedure of the military
law .... but the due process clause guarantees to them that this military procedure will
be applied to them in a fundamentally fair way. We conclude that it is open for a civil court
in a habeas corpus proceeding to consider whether the circumstances of a court-martial pro-
ceeding and the manner in which it was conducted ran afoul of the basic standard of fair-
ness which is involved in the constitutional concept of due process of law and, if it so finds,
to declare that the relator had been deprived of his liberty in violation of the fifth amend-
ment and to discharge him from custody." Id. at 666. See also Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F. Supp.
823 (D. Kans. 1947); Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1946).
However, the Supreme Court subsequently held that it was error for a circuit court of
appeals to extend its review of a military conviction "to such matters as the propositions set
forth in the staff judge advocate's report, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain respond-
ent's conviction, the adequacy of the pre-trial investigation, and the competency of the law
member and defense counsel," for the purpose of establishing compliance with the due
process clause. Hiatt v. Brown, supra note 17, at 110.
1 9 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-468 (1938). It was on the springboard of this authority
that the federal courts began a wider review of courts-martial convictions, on the assumption
that the expanded concept of divestiture of jurisdiction was "a fortiorari" applicable to the
military courts. See Anthony v. Hunter, supra note 18, at 826.
20 Bums v. Wilson, supra note 1.
I Id. at 140. "This Court has played no role in its (i.e., military law) development; we have




had provided that military tribunal determinations were "final" and "bind-
ing" 23 upon all courts, such provision did not displace a civilian court's
jurisdiction of a habeas corpus application from a military prisoner.2 4 In
essence, the "finality" of a court-martial decision meant only that if the alle-
gations raised in the writ have been fully and fairly considered in the mili-
tary tribunal, a federal court is not free to grant the writ merely to re-eval-
uate the evidence.2 5 Rather, the civilian court's review was limited to a de-
termination of whether the military tribunal had given fair consideration
to any claim of constitutional unfairness or deprivation of right.26
It has been suggested by the Supreme Court that Congress, in making
rules and regulations for the Armed Services, is not limited by the Bill of
Rights. 27 However, the development of civilian court review of court-mar-
tial convictions precludes the absolute acceptance of this suggestion. The
due process concepts stated in United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt28
and Burns v. Wilson 29 indicate that a serviceman on trial before a military
tribunal is at least guaranteed by the fifth amendment a fundamentally fair
application of the provisions of military law. These concepts have found
their most recent expansion in the pronouncements of the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals"O and its treatment of a serviceman's right to legal counsel. Be-
fore discussing this court's views on the right to counsel and the serviceman,
attention must be directed momentarily to legislative activity in this area.
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
While judicial activity provided assurances to those in military service of nec-
essary protections of a civilized society, Congress also exercised its legislative
See, e.g., Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, art. 50 (h), 62 Stat. 604, 637-638.
2 Burns v. Wilson, supra note 1, at 142.
Ibid. The impact of the Burns decision on a federal court's scope of collateral review of
military convictions appears uncertain. One view of the decision sees it as establishing the
proposition that once Congress has legislatively struck a balance between a serviceman's con-
stitutional rights and military necessity, the federal courts are precluded from questioning
this balance. Note, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, supra note 17,
at 146-147. This view would not find Burns inconsistent with Hiatt v. Brown, supra note 17.
Chief Justice Warren, however, gives a broader interpretation to Burns, i.e., that "soldiers
may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes."
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rrv. 181, 188 (1962).
0 For the constitutional guarantee of due process is meaningful enough, and sufficiently
adaptible, to protect soldiers-as well as civilians-from the crude injustices of a trial so
conducted that it becomes bent on affixing guilt by dispensing with rudimentary fairness
rather than finding truth by adhering to those basic guarantees which have long been
recognized and honored by the military courts as well as the civil courts. Burns v.
Wilson, supra note 1, at 142-143.
See, e.g., Ex parte MiUlligan, supra note 16, at 138 (concurring opinion): "The power of
Congress, in the government of land and naval forces and of the militia, is not at all affected
by the fifth or any other amendment."
21 Supra note 18.
2Supra note 1.
I See 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964), which provides for the establishment of the United States
Court of Military Appeals and defines its structure and responsibility.
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powers to aid in the struggle for the protection of military personnel. Mili-
tary discipline was governed by the Articles of War, enacted in 1806.31 Re-
vised in 191632 and in 1920,33 the Articles of War left much to be desired in
providing procedural due process for an accused before a military tribunal.34
Public dissatisfaction with alleged military injustice during World War I135
resulted in the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)38
-a comprehensive scheme of legislation designed to protect the rights of
those persons subject to military justice.
That the UCMJ has been successful cannot be denied.3 7 Indeed, it has
been said that, in some instances, military personnel receive greater protec-
tion under the UCMJ than do their civilian counterparts under state or
federal law.3 8 In addition to the provisions for counsel, discussed below, Con-
gress has, through the UCMJ, assured military personnel many constitu-
tional and procedural safeguards similar to those afforded civilians.8 9
To cite but a few examples, self-incrimination, 40 cruel and unusual pun-
ishment,41 double jeopardy, 42 and command influence on court-martial per-
sonnel 43 are prohibited. The accused may challenge members of both gen-
eral' and special courts-martial for cause and peremptorily, and the law offi-
ft 1806 Articles of War, arts. 1-101, 2 Stat. 359 (1806) (repealed by the UCMJ).
8Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, arts. 1-121, 39 Stat. 650. The revisions "were only a re-
arrangement and reclassification without much alteration in substance." Morgan, The Back-
ground of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. Rav. 169 (1953).
mAct of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, arts. 1-121, 41 Stat. 787. The revisions embodied some "pro-
visions protecting the rights of an accused." Morgan, supra note 32, at 172.
84 See Morgan, supra note 32, at 169-182.
8 See especially White, The Uniform Code of Military Justice: The Background and the
Problem, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 197, 198-209 (1961).
Ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107 (1950), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964).
0John S. Stillman, National Chairman of the American Veterans Committee, testifying
before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (hereinafter referred to as sub-
committee), stated: "Blackstone at one time referred to the English soldier as being 'in a
state of servitude in the midst of a nation of free men'. We have no such stark contrast today,
thanks largely to the adoption in 1950 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice." Transcript
of Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and a Special Sub-
committee of the Senate Armed Services Committee in Joint Hearings on Military Justice
and Military Discharges, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 404 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Transcript:
1966 Hearings); see, also, Statement of the Honorable Paul J. Kilday, Judge, United States
Court of Military Appeals, Transcript: 1966 Hearings 608. For an early evaluation of the
UCMJ, see Ward, UCMJ-Does It Work?, 6 VAND. L. Ryv. 186 (1953).
"Brigadier General Kenneth J. Hodson, Assistant Judge Advocate General for Military
Justice, Department of the Army, testifying before the subcommittee, stated: "In many re-
spects, members of the armed forces charged with criminal offenses are now accorded more
legal safeguards than members of the civilian community in similar circumstances. The pres-
ent requirements for legal representation of the military accused before and during trial in
general court-martial cases and upon the automatic appellate review of those cases are ex-
amples." Transcript: 1966 Hearings 37-38.
See Quinn, The United States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process, 35
ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 225 (1960).
- 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1964).
10 U.S.C. § 855 (1964).
" 10 U.S.C. § 844 (1964).
"10 U.S.C. § 837 (1964).
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cer for cause.44 The accused has the opportunity to obtain witnesses and evi-
dence and to compel the appearance and testimony of witnesses and the pro-
duction of evidence. 45 Furthermore, the UCMJ furnishes an extensive sys-
tem of appellate review.46 All courts-martial are automatically reviewed by
the convening officer and a member of the Judge Advocate General's Office.
4 7
Certain convictions must be reviewed by the service Board of Review 48 and
by the Court of Military Appeals. 4 9 The accused is entitled to legally quali-
fied counsel before both the Board of Review and the Court of Military
Appeals.50
Concerning right to counsel, the UCMJ presently requires that trial coun-
sel (analogous to the prosecution)5 1 and defense counsel be detailed for
each general and special court-martial.52 An accused is permitted to retain
civilian counsel, at his own expense, for either a general or special court-
martial.53 It is important to note that the term "counsel", as used in the
UCMJ, does not necessarily refer to legally qualified counsel. Unless counsel
is defined as Article 27 (b) counsel, it is understood that military, or non-
legal counsel, is intended.
5 4
For a general court-martial, which has jurisdiction to try all persons and
offenses subject to the UCMJ and which can adjudge any sentence, includ-
ing death,55 the law officer (analogous to the judge),5O the trial counsel, and
the defense counsel must be qualified attorneys. 57 For a special court-mar-
tial, which has jurisdiction to try all persons and noncapital offenses, 58 but
which is limited to adjudging sentences of a maximum of six months con-
finement, a bad conduct discharge, and lesser penalties, 59 the accused is
not entitled to a qualified attorney as defense counsel unless the trial coun-
sel is a qualified attorney. 60 There is no provision for a law officer at a special
court-martial.6' For a summary court-martial, which has jurisdiction to try
-10 U.S.C. § 841 (1964).
10 U.S.C. §§ 846-47 (1964).
- 10 U.S.C. §§ 859-76 (1964).
- 10 U.S.C. §§ 860-65 (1964).
10 U.S.C. § 866 (b) (1964).
-10 U.S.C. § 867 (b) (1964).
10 U.S.C. § 870 (1964).
- 10 U.S.C. § 838 (1964).
10 U.S.C. § 827 (a) (1964).
10 U.S.C. § 838 (b) (1964).
- 10 U.S.C. § 827 (b) (1964).
10 U.S.C. § 818 (1964).
10 U.S.C. §§ 826-27 (1964).
10 U.S.C. §§ 839, 851 (b) (1964).
10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964).
wIbid.
- 10 U.S.C. § 827 (c) (1964).
61 The president of a special court-martial has similar duties as the law officer of a general
court-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 851 (1964). However, no member of a special court-martial need
be a lawyer. 10 U.S.C. § 816 (2) (1964).
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only enlisted personnel and which is limited to adjudging a sentence of a
maximum of one month confinement or its equivalent, 62 there exists no pro-
vision for either counsel or law officer.
63
In addition to the provisions for legal counsel and the other constitu-
tional and procedural safeguards mentioned above, the military services
themselves take care to see that non-legal or military counsel are reasonably
prepared in the skill of administering military justice. This is accomplished
primarily by instruction in the arts of military justice64 and by the use of the
Manual for Courts-Martial65 by court-martial personnel.
It is apparent, then, that "Congress ... has responded to the challenge
of extending the constitutional safeguards, so cherished in civilian life, to
the countless thousands of men and women who enter the Armed Serv-
ices." 66 It is equally apparent that, while there has been no clear constitu-
tional directive to Congress to afford servicemen the sixth amendment "right
to assistance of counsel", much has been done by legislative activity to as-
sure military personnel, under some but not all circumstances, the assist-
ance of counsel, both military and legal. Whether enough has been done is,
like all questions relating to the protection of American citizens, open to de-
bate.
Court of Military Appeals
Establishment of the United States Court of Military Appeals by Congress
has made that court the primary guardian of servicemen's rights before mili-
tary tribunals. The court has declared that its duty is to interpret the UCMJ
in the light of constitutional protections and that all Bill of Rights guaran-
tees apply to servicemen except those which are expressly or by necessary
implication excluded,67 reversing its earlier view that the rights of military
personnel were determined by the UCMJ and that any conflict between the
Code and the Constitution should be resolved in favor of the Code. 68
How this interpretation of its duty affects the right to counsel, however,
is unclear, as shown by the recent decision of United States v. Culp.6 9
Though the Court of Military Appeals had previously reserved the right to
10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964).
10 U.S.C. §§ 816 (3), 827, 838 (1964).
e' See, e.g., [1964] ARMY JAG ANN. REP. 60.
e Exec. Order No. 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303 (1951), prescribing the U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (1951), pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1964).
16 Statement of Senator Ervin, 111 CONG. REG. 1227 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1965).
e1United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-431, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-247 (1960); see
also Warren, supra note 25, at 188-190. The Chief Justice considers the UCMJ as the guardian
of the Bill of Rights in the military and the Court of Military Appeals as the civilian "Su-
preme Court" for the military.
"I See United States v. Sutton, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 11 C.M.R. 220 (1953), and Quinn, supra
note 39, at 232. Sutton was a logical extension of United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1
C.M.R. 74 (1951), which based a serviceman's rights on congressional statute.
Ct 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
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pass on the qualifications of officers assigned to defend an accused before
courts-martial, 70 in Culp, it was confronted with the determination by a
Board of Review that the sixth amendment guaranteed the right to legally
qualified counsel to a defendant convicted of larceny at a special court-mar-
tial and sentenced a bad conduct discharge.7' Judge Kilday, writing the
opinion of the court, stated that "qualifications of counsel for courts-mar-
tial are a matter within the sound discretion of Congress" 72 and that, in his
opinion, the sixth amendment did not apply to court-martial trials.7 ' Chief
Judge Quinn, in a concurring opinion, took the position that the sixth
amendment right to counsel applied to courts-martial, but that the appoint-
ment of an officer pursuant to Article 27 (c) of the UCMJ fulfills the require-
ment.7 4 Judge Ferguson, also concurring, agreed that an accused before a
court-martial was entitled to the sixth amendment right to counsel but con-
cluded that the defendant was not denied this right since he chose to be rep-
resented by the appointed officers. 75
Implied in the Culp decision, therefore, as expressed in the two concur-
ring opinions, is that the sixth amendment directly applies to servicemen
in respect to their right to counsel before courts-martial, but that the re-
quirement is met by the appointment of military counsel. Although Chief
Judge Quinn questioned the desirability of continuing to permit nonlaw-
yers to practice before tribunals empowered to impose bad conduct dischar-
ges,76 as did Judge Ferguson,77 he was convinced that Congress has the un-
disputed right to establish the qualifications of counsel appearing before
courts-martial78 and that "the existing qualifications for counsel before
those courts [special courts-martial] are reasonably calculated to insure that
appointed counsel possess knowledge of the law normally incident to special
court-martial practice.1
79
Thus, the sixth amendment looms in the background of special courts-
martial proceedings, and by implication all courts-martial proceedings, but
the extent of its application is uncertain.80 The Culp decision, however, re-
70United States v. Gardner, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 25 C.M.R. 310 (1958); United States v. Fisher,
8 U.S.M.C.A. 396, 24 C.M.R. 200 (1957); United States v. Williams, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 443, 24
C.M.R. 253 (1957). See generally Avins, Accused's Rights to Defense Counsel Before a Military
Court, 42 U. DET. L.J. 21 (1964).
" United States v. Culp, supra note 69, at 218, 33 C.M.R. at 413.
"Id. at 216, 33 C.M.R. at 428.
"ibid.
7 
Id. at 217, 33 C.M.R. at 429.
5Id. at 219, 33 C.M.R. at 431.
7 Id. at 218, 33 C.M.R. at 430.
7Id. at 219-221, 33 C.M.R. at 431-433.
78 Id. at 217, 33 C.M.R. at 429.
" Id. at 218, 33 C.M.R. at 430.
o The Culp decision has been interpreted as setting up a double standard of constitutional
rights, one for civilians and one for servicemen, indicating that "civilian due process" and
"military due process" are not the same. See 49 VA. L. Rav. 1581, 1587-1588 (1963). See also
Quinn, supra note 39, at 233.
1966]
Catholic University Law Review
veals a willingness on the part of the courts to relate the constitutional "right
to assistance of counsel" to the fundamental fairness or military due proc-
ess to which servicemen standing before courts-martial are entitled-a will-
ingness short, though, of direct application of the sixth amendment provi-
sion in all its force.
THE RECENT CASES:
Application of Stapley; LeBallister v. Warden
Almost without exception,8 ' it has been held in the federal courts that the
due process guarantee of the fifth amendment and the right to counsel guar-
antee of the sixth amendment do not require that an accused before a court-
martial be represented by legally qualified counsel.8 2 Generally, where the
sixth amendment has been held to apply, the requirement is satisfied if de-
fense counsel is a commissioned officer admitted to practice before courts-
martial.8
3
Application of Stapley84 and LeBallister v. Warden85 demonstrate that
confusion and doubt continue to affect servicemen's right to counsel before
special courts-martial. In Stapley the petitioner brought a writ of habeas
corpus to secure his release from custody after being sentenced to confine-
ment for three months, a forfeit of two-thirds pay for six months and a de-
motion.86 He had been charged with breaches of military orders and disci-
pline and with writing bad checks. 87 Stapley had been tried by a special court-
martial and his request for the appointment of a lawyer as defense counsel
had been denied.88 Financially unable to secure a civilian lawyer,8 9 he was
81 One of the exceptions is Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947), in which
a military conviction was voided, on the basis of the sixth amendment, because the accused
was denied adequate assistance of counsel. Even in Shapiro, the circumstances were such that
the judge characterized the proceedings as an example of "military despotism." Id. at 207.
Shapiro also demonstrates an alternative form of attacking a military conviction collaterally
in a civilian court, i.e., by suit in the Court of Claims to recover a fine or forfeiture, in this
case back pay, assessed by the court-martial. This method of attack dates back to Swaim v.
United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897). Another method of attacking a military conviction is
shown by Jackson v. McElroy, 163 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1958), where the court held that
the jurisdiction of the convicting court-martial could be reviewed in an action for a declara-
tory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964), wherein the petitioner contends that his con-
viction and sentence are void and requests a mandatory injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361
(1964) to remove the discharge. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit approved
this method of attack. Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965).
82Ex parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Cal. 1945); Duval v. Humphrey, 83 F. Supp. 457
(M.D.Pa. 1949); Adams v. Hiatt, 79 F. Supp. 433 (M.D.Pa. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 946
(1949); Smith v. Hiatt, 170 F.2d 61 (3rd Cir. 1948).
'Romero v. Squier, 133 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 785 (1943); accord,
Altmayer v. Sanford, 148 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1945).
84246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
1 247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kans. 1965).
Application of Stapley, supra note 84, at 320.
17 Id. at 318.
18 Ibid.
8 Id. at 319.
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assigned military defense counsel with no legal training and no experience
in court-martial proceedings.9 0 Under the advice of his assigned counsel,
Stapley pleaded guilty to all charges and settled for a prior arranged "deal"
which his advisors had worked out with the commanding officer whereby he
would only receive two months confinement at the most.91
District Judge Christensen found that defense counsel "were wholly un-
qualified to act as 'counsel' with respect to military law, procedure, trial or
defense practicality, or at all,"92 and that the court-martial trial "notwith-
standing that all participants acted in good faith, constituted no more than
idle ceremony or form in accordance with a script arranged beforehand, and
limited and determined by defense counsel." 93 Consistent with these findings,
Judge Christensen concluded that petitioner was entitled to his release and
granted the writ of habeas corpus.
94
In reaching this result, judge Christensen concluded that the sixth
amendment right to counsel applied to proceedings before special courts-
martial, "particularly where the charges are substantial or involve moral
turpitude or may result in a substantial deprivation of liberty." 95 However,
this apparently broad statement was qualified as follows:
The circumstances of this case render it unnecessary to decide whether be-
fore such tribunals under all circumstances an accused is entitled to be repre-
sented by counsel who have been trained and admitted to practice before a
civilian court.... It is sufficient here to consider only whether under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, and in view of the frustration of petitioner's efforts to
obtain qualified legal services because of his inability to pay them, minimal re-
quirements of due process particularly in view of the Sixth Amendment, required
that counsel made available to the petitioner had requisite competency or qualifi-
cation in military or civilian laws and proceedings ... beyond that common to
every officer in the military service.9 6
Is the analysis in the opinion any different than that of the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals in similar cases?97 Essentially, Judge Christensen has evaluated





14Id. at 322. The writ was granted on the traditional basis of lack of jurisdiction in the
court-martial, though by the indirect method of divestiture of jurisdiction, in that Judge
Christensen held that the court-martial was without jurisdiction by reason of its violation of
the petitioner's constitutional rights of effective assistance of counsel and due process. See
notes 18 and 19 supra and accompanying text.
5Id. at 320.
9 'Id. at 320-321.
0 See cases cited note 70 supra; but see infra note 107.
98Application of Stapley, supra note 84, at 318. "[R]epeated acts of claimed fraud in the
issuance of checks some of which if established, could have constituted felonies in a civil
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tional makeup of the defendant,90 the circumstances surrounding the pro-
ceedings, 1 ° the fundamental fairness of the proceedings as a whole, 101 and,
finally, the qualifications of the assigned counsel to cope with all these fac-
tors and give the accused the benefit of an intelligent and competent defense
which meets the requirements of the sixth amendment as it applies to mili-
tary tribunals through a concept of due process.102
Such an evaluation determines whether the "minimal requirements of due
process and the sixth amendment"'103 are present. The minimal require-
ments
are not satisfied by the assignment as counsel to an accused of officers with sub-
stantially no experience, training or knowledge in the field of law, either mili-
tary or civilian .... it is no longer either reasonable or necessary, if it ever were,
to deem any officer qualified to act as defense counsel for an accused merely be-
cause he is an officer; nor is it either reasonable or necessary to limit the avail-
ability of qualified defense counsel to cases in which the prosecution is represent-
ed by qualified counsel.
"[M]ilitary due process", while within the competence of Congress to establish
in view of military necessity, must comport with minimal requirements of con-
stitutional due process to render it immune from attack in the courts when in-
consistent confinement of military personnel is involved.1
04
The decision in Stapley would not preclude the assignment of non-legal
counsel. However, due process will not be satisfied unless the counsel pos-
sesses "at least minimal qualifications to rationally advise on substantive and
procedural legal problems...."105 The decision goes further than the ap-
court and all of which imputed moral turpitude. Such charges involve problems of substan-
tive law as well as practice, reasonably necessitating knowledgeable legal counsel, advice and
assistance."
0 Ibid. "Stapley at the time he faced these charges was of the age nineteen years, apparently
immature even for his age, suffering from emotional difficulties, and of limited experience."
100 Supra note 89.
101 See notes 91, 93 supra and accompanying text.
112Application of Stapley, supra note 84, at 318-320. The defense counsel and assistant de-
fense counsel were a captain and second lieutenant. The captain was a veterinarian who had
been in the service for about two years and had no acquaintance with military court pro-
cedures. His total training as an officer in military law had been two days. The second lieu-
tenant was 22 years old and had been in the service for a year. He had a political science
background in college and had studied the UCMJ in the ROTC program. He had, however,
no practical experience or special knowledge in legal matters or procedure. Judge Christensen
found their advice to their client totally ineffectual and incorrect in some instances, i.e.,
defense counsel's belief that intoxication was no defense for a specific intent crime. Also,
counsel advised the defendant to plead guilty to all charges, including one thereafter ordered
dismissed by the convening authority for legal insufficiency to state an offense. All these
factors led to a conclusion that representation in this case did not constitute in fact or law
"representation by 'counsel' either civil or military."





proach advocated by Chief Judge Quinn.I0a While Stapley would apply the
sixth amendment to special courts-martial, it would not necessarily require
appointment of legally qualified counsel. However, appointment of an offi-
cer, as presently required by Congress, would not always suffice. Rather, the
minimal requirements of due process require a case-by-case examination to
determine whether the qualifications of counsel, lawyer or nonlawyer, will
enable an accused to have a full and fair consideration of the charges against
him consistent with the requirements of fundamental fairness.107
LeBallister v. Warden s0 8 involved two separate special courts-martial con-
victions on charges of absence without leave and disobedience of orders,109
stemming primarily from petitioner's actions in pursuance of his personal
beliefs as a conscientious objector." 0 These convictions each resulted
in confinement for six months and forfeiture of a portion of the petitioner's
pay."' LeBallister did not request representation by civilian or military
counsel of his own choice at either proceeding, and was represented by
appointed military counsel. 1 2 Both trial counsel and defense counsel were
infantry officers; 1 3 none were judge advocates, graduates of an accredited law
school, nor members of the bar of any court. 1 4 LeBallister applied for release
on a writ of habeas corpus, on the basis that he was not given assistance of
counsel as required by the sixth amendment." 5
Chief Judge Stanley denied the writ and found that petitioner's counsel
"represented him at each trial ably and as effectively as was possible under
the circumstances," ' 1 6 and concluded that
an accused before a military court is not entitled as a matter of right under the
Sixth Amendment to representation by legally trained counsel. The right of an
accused to be so represented at a general court-martial springs not from the Sixth
11* See note 69 supra, at 216, 33 C.M.R. at 428. (Quinn, C.J., concurring).
117 The Court of Military Appeals has not disturbed, on constitutional grounds, the balance
struck by Congress between military needs and the rights of servicemen as set out in Article
27 (b) of the UCMJ. In Culp, it found that the qualifications established for nonlawyers
at special courts-martial bore a reasonable relationship to the purpose to be accomplished.
United States v. Culp, supra note 69, at 217-218, 33 C.M.R. at 429-430 (Quinn, C.J., concur-
ring). Judge Christensen, however, used constitutional grounds to examine this balance and
found that, at least in Stapley's case, the requirements established for non-legal counsel were
not sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of due process and the sixth amendment.
106 247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kans. 1965).
1






I Id. at 350. LeBallister's petition for the writ of habeas corpus stated that he "was not
afforded the opportunity to consult with, nor was he represented by competent counsel,
during proceedings before special court-martial." Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Le-
Ballister v. Warden, No. 3919 H.C., D. Kans. Nov. 22, 1965, pp. 1-2.
16 LeBallister v. Warden, supra note 108, at 351.
1966]
Catholic University Law Review
Amendment, but from the action of Congress under Section 8, Article I of the
Constitution. No such right is accorded by Congress to one being tried by special
court-martial. See United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411
(1963).1 1
7
While petitioner cited the Stapley decision in his behalf, Chief Judge
Stanley stated that Stapley was expressly limited "to the peculiar circum-
stances of that case, including 'the frustration of the petitioner's efforts to
obtain qualified legal services because of his financial inability to pay for
them,' circumstances not present here." 118
The LeBallister decision appears to be based on a rigid concept of "mili-
tary due process", i.e., a military accused derives his rights solely from the
UCMJ and not from the Constitution. 119 In view of the facts in the instant
case, Chief Judge Stanley could have reached the same conclusion by adopt-
ing the approach employed by Judge Christensen. For example, the offense
charged was strictly a military offense; 120 petitioner was mentally compe-
tent,121 well educated and sophisticated; 122 no prior "deal" had been ar-
ranged between defense counsel and the commanding officer; petitioner had
not requested counsel of his own choice, nor had he questioned the ade-
quacy or qualifications of his assigned counsel. 12 3 The circumstances, then,
were quite unlike those in Stapley, and petitioner's counsel was evidently
qualified to effectively cope with them.
24
Had Chief Judge Stanley employed this approach, it would have been un-
necessary to reach the questions of whether the sixth amendment required
u, Id. at 352.
n Ibid. This also reflects the view of the Services on the Stapley case as expressed by a
Justice Department spokesman. "We interpret the decision as being restricted to the facts of
this case. The opinion did not say that the Army had to appoint lawyers in every special
court-martial case. The law says someone with training and experience in these matters must
be provided. And the court found in this case that the officer had no experience in this
field." The Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1, 1965, p. A-3, col. 4.
'- This is a return to the view as articulated by the Supreme Court in United States ex tel.
Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336, 344 (1922). "To those in the military or naval service of the
United States the military law is due process." But see the statement in Burns, supra note
69, that "the constitutional guarantee of due process is meaningful enough, and sufficiently
adaptible, to protect soldiers as well as civilians." Id. at 142.




121 LeBallister's primary counsel at both special courts-martial was Lt. Craig B. Anderson,
a college graduate and a graduate of the Army Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning,
Georgia, where he had received twelve hours of instruction in military justice and partici-
pated in mock courts-martial. Before being appointed to defend LeBallister, he had twice
served as assistant defense counsel at other courts-martial. He was Brigade defense counsel
at Fort Ord, California, for special courts-martial at the time of LeBallister's second trial in
June, 1965. Lt. Anderson stated that he in no way influenced the petitioner's guilty pleas at
either proceeding. Anderson wished to prove extenuating circumstances in order to mitigate
the charges against the accused, but LeBallister refused such efforts. Affidavit of Lt. Craig B.
Anderson, LeBallister v. Warden, No. 3919 H.C., D. Kans. Nov. 22, 1965, pp. 1-2.
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appointment of legally trained counsel. For, on the facts, it could have been
found that the "minimal requirements of due process and the sixth amend-
ment" were satisfied not merely because infantry officers were assigned to
represent LeBallister pursuant to Article 27 (c) of the UCMJ, but because
the counsel assigned possessed "at least minimal qualifications to rationally
advise on substantive and procedural legal problems."
As the decisions now stand, and unfortunately there will not be an oppor-
tunity for the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to resolve the differ-
ences,12 5 Stapley accepts the position of Chief Judge Quinn and Judge Fer-
guson of the Court of Military Appeals, to the extent that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel applies to military tribunals, but goes further in that
assignment of counsel pursuant to the UCMJ will not suffice unless the mini-
mal requirements of due process are satisfied;12 6 whereas LeBallister stands
for the traditional notion, as expressed by Judge Kilday of the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals,12 7 that the sixth amendment does not apply to military tribu-
nals and that it is in the sole discretion of Congress to establish qualifica-
tions for counsel for courts-martial.
These two decisions, then, along with United States v. Culp,12 8 indicate
that, although Congress, the courts, and the military services themselves
have made major advancements in providing the procedural safeguard of
assistance of counsel, either legal or non-legal, to the men and women of
the Armed Services, the question of exactly what the sixth amendment re-
quires concerning the right to counsel and the military services is by no
means settled.
S. 750
While it cannot be denied that Congress has been alert to the need of assist-
ance of counsel for military personnel, investigation of the process of ad-
ministering military justice reveals various factors indicating the necessity
of further action by Congress if military personnel are to be fully protected
-particularly when right to counsel is concerned.
1 Stapley's attorney filed his writ for the prisoner's release on the fifty-eighth day of con-
finement. The prisoner would have gone free at the end of sixty days under the reduced
sentence he had received from his commanding officer by pleading guilty to all charges. See
note 91, supra, and accompanying text. In view of this, the case was only two days from being
moot when it was filed. Because of this factor and the factual circumstances strongly favoring
the petitioner, the Solicitor General's office did not appeal. In LeBallister, after initially re-
serving the right to appeal, petitioner's attorney allowed his appeal time to lapse. Also,
petitioner wrote the clerk of the Kansas District Court expressing his desire to abandon any
right to appeal. Therefore, the government's motion to preclude appeal was granted on
February 18, 1965. (The above information was obtained through personal interview with
Stapley's attorney, James P. Cowley, through the Army Litigation Department, Judge Advo-
cate General's Corps, and through interviews with Lt. Col. Abraham Nemrow, JAGC, Chief
of Army Litigation, who participated as counsel for the government in LeBallister.)
'~' See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
" United States v. Culp, supra note 69, at 200, 33 C.M.R. at 412.
' Supra note 69.
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First, while the Armed Services have highly competent legally qualified
counsel, the competency of non-legal military counsel is subject to doubt.
The non-legal defense counsel in the LeBallister129 case was considered com-
petent. 3 0 However, their competency to deal with the intricacies and tech-
nicalities of the law, even if one considers military law to be more simplified
in practice than civil law,' 3' is questionable. 13 2 Certainly the total lack of
legal qualifications of the military defense counsel in the Stapley case is evi-
dence that the provisions for counsel in the UCMJ are not fool-proof in pro-
viding competent and qualified counsel for military personnel. 3
3
A second factor is the loss of certain benefits and the universal recognition
of the stigma resulting from a bad conduct discharge." 4 While it is the pol-
icy of the Army not to allow special courts-martial to impose a bad conduct
discharge"'5 and while the Air Force invariably makes available legally
trained counsel for an accused at a special court-martial,' 3 6 there is no statu-
tory requirement that these guarantees will be preserved. Of concern also is
the possibility that the use of administrative discharges is a "means of cir-
cumventing the requirements of the Code." 137 The loss of benefits and re-
sulting stigma is no less the case for an administrative discharge under con-
ditions other than honorable.1 8 While the Department of Defense has is-
sued various directives concerning the right to counsel in connection with
administrative discharges under conditions other than honorable,"39 counsel
need not be furnished if unavailable, 140 and there is, again, no statutory re-
quirement preserving this safeguard.
A final factor having an impact on Congress' duty to assure military per-
sonnel certain safeguards has been the recognition by the Supreme Court
3 LeBallister v. Warden, supra note 108.
mId. at 351; see note 124 supra.
United States v. Cuip, supra note 69, at 217, 33 C.M.R. at 428 (Quinn, C.J., concurring).
" Infra notes 215-219 and accompanying text.
" For further illustration see Neal v. United States, No. 226-62, Ct. Cl., Jan. 20, 1966.
111 CoNG. REc. 1228 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1965).
Summary: Report of Hearings by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (hereinafter cited as Summary: 1962 Hearings), 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1963); under A.R. 27-12, par. 1, Oct. 15, 1965, court reporters are not
detailed to a special court-martial; consequently a special court-martial cannot adjudge a
bad-conduct discharge. See 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964).
21 Summary: 1962 Hearings 42.
- [1960] C.M.A. & JAG ANN. REP. 12.
U3 111 CONG. REc. 1228 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1965); Ervin, The Congressional Study on the
Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, JAG J. 4, 6-7 (1963).
180 The latest Directive is DoD DIRECTIVE 1332.14, Administrative Discharges, Dec. 20, 1965.
110 The Directive is similar to S. 750 § 2 in that it provides that "no member shall be dis-
charged under conditions other than honorable unless he is afforded the right to present his
case before'an administrative discharge board with the advice and assistance of counsel
.... Sec. V, A (2). Counsel is defined as "a lawyer within the meaning of article 27 (b) (1)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice unless appropriate authority certifies in the perma-
nent record the nonavailability of a lawyer so qualified and sets forth the qualifications of
the substituted nonlawyer counsel." Sec. IV, K.
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that right to counsel is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial."' 41 The
reaction by some of the states to the Court's pronouncement has been an
extension of the right to counsel further for civilians than the UCMJ pres-
ently extends it for military personnel.
42
These various factors have led to the conclusion, as expressed by Senator
Ervin, that "except in an emergency situation created by war, any service-
man should have the assistance of a qualified attorney to assist him in con-
nection with a proceeding which may result in a discharge under other than
honorable conditions."' 143 Therefore, on January 26, 1965, Senator Ervin,
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, introduced
S. 750144-a bill which would further extend the right to legal counsel for
the men and women of the Armed Forces. The bill, one of eighteen, is part
of "a legislative program designed to further safeguard the constitutional
rights of our Nation's service men and women who for so long have sacrificed
so much to protect our American way of life."'
145
The set of bills was introduced following an extensive four-year study by
the subcommittee146 and would make alterations to various aspects of the
UCMJ.1 47 As far as the role of legal counsel in administering military jus-
tice is concerned, the proposed legislation would, in addition to the changes
required by S. 750 discussed below, give a statutory basis to the field judi-
ciary presently employed by the Army and Navy, extend the system to the
Air Force, facilitate the interservice use of field judiciary members, and allow
'14 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 325 (1963). For a development of the cases through
which the Court gave fuller meaning to the right to counsel provision, see Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 39 (1963); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
"2 For a discussion of the changes in practice, which are taking place in various states, in
an attempt to resolve the problems concerning the scope of the Gideon decision, see Silver-
stein, The Continuing Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the States, 51 A.B.A.J. 1023 (1965).
111 CONG. Rac. 1228 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1965).
" s. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
"' 111 CONG. REC. 1227 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1965).
14 Extensive hearings were held by the subcommittee in 1962 to determine the need for
legislation to insure a more satisfactory method of safeguarding the constitutional rights
of military personnel. In addition to the information received during these hearings
from the Defense Department, Court of Military Appeals, bar associations, veterans
groups, and experts in military law, the subcommittee also conducted an extensive field
investigation in Europe to obtain firsthand views as to the adequacy of our present sys-
tem of military justice. Ibid.
The Summary Report issued by the subcommittee contained twenty-two recommendations,
most of which were embodied in the set of bills first introduced by Senator Ervin on August
6, 1963. No action was taken at this time. Following the introduction of the bills on January
25, 1965, hearings were conducted in January and March of 1966.
"I The 18 bills now before this Subcommittee can be categorized by their principle
objectives as follows: 1) those which strengthen the independence, prestige and military
justice personnel in the exercise of their duties; 2) those which further implement the
Constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law; 3) those which simplify and improve military justice pro-
cedures; and 4) those which close jurisdictional gaps. Transcript: 1966 Hearings 405.
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the use of civilian attorneys in the system; 148 establish a Judge Advocate
General's Corps for the Navy; 149 require a law officer to be detailed to a spe-
cial court-martial adjudging a bad conduct discharge; 150 provide legal coun-
sel to serve on appellate review of certain administrative proceedings;' 51 re-
quire a law officer to be detailed to an administrative board issuing a dis-
charge under conditions other than honorable; 152 and insure the right to
counsel in cases involving minor offenses by abolishing the summary court-
martial.
53
Section 1 of S. 750 would amend 10 U.S.C. § 819, providing, in part, that
a special court-martial, except in time of war, cannot adjudge a bad con-
duct discharge "unless the accused was represented at the trial, or afforded
the opportunity to be represented at the trial," by legally qualified counsel.
Section 2 would amend 10 U.S.C. § 941, providing, in part, that no mem-
ber of the Armed Forces can be administratively discharged under condi-
tions other than honorable unless such member is afforded the opportunity
to appear before a board called for such purpose and to be represented be-
fore such board by legally qualified counsel.
The subcommittee's conclusion, after the hearings held in early 1962, that
it is "undesirable that servicemen receive a bad conduct discharge without
being provided an attorney, if the accused desires a lawyer's aid and if there
is any feasible method for the services to provide him a legally qualified
defense counsel," 154 is apparently shared by all concerned with military jus-
tice, for during the hearings held in 1966, § 1 of the proposed bill was ap-
proved by the judges of the Court of Military Appeals, 15 5 the Judge Advo-
cate Generals, 56 the Department of Defense,157 and almost all others testify-
ing before the subcommittee. s8 In view of the policy of the Army and Air
Force regarding special courts-martial, 59 it appears that the Navy is the
only branch of service which would have any difficulty adjusting to the prac-
tice. In any event, there appears to be no opposition to § 1.
Testimony before the subcommitte reveals, though, that there are some
148 S. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
'I S. 746, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
'0 S. 752, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
m S. 753, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
10 S. 754, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965).
15 S. 759, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965).
Im Summary: 1962 Hearings 43.
Statements of Chief Judge Quinn and Judges Kilday and Ferguson, Transcript: 1966
Hearings 578, 608, 620; see also [1964] C.M.A. & JAG ANN. REP. 2.
"0 Transcript: 1966 Hearings 27, 38-39.
57 Ibid.
8 A notable exception was the testimony of Frederick Bernays Wiener, who recommended
that only a general court-martial be permitted to issue a discharge for misconduct, thereby
eliminating the need for legal counsel at either special courts-martial or administrative pro-
ceedings. Id. at 639-645.
'5 Supra notes 135, 136.
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who feel Congress should further extend the right to legal counsel. One wit-
ness, a lawyer whose practice is confined largely to representation of military
personnel, stated: "In view of the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Gideon v. Wainwright I can perceive no justification for permitting
the trial of an individual before a special court-martial where he is not fur-
nished with qualified counsel to represent him."'
6 0
This view was shared by the witness testifying in behalf of the American
Civil Liberties Union, who added that
Not only is a court-martial conviction a criminal conviction that remains with a
defendant the rest of his life, but the sentences that may be imposed (short of a
punitive discharge), such as confinement at hard labor for six months, forfeiture
of two-thirds of one's pay, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, are
sufficiently severe to justify the required presence of a legally trained defense
counsel.11
Chief Judge Quinn of the Court of Military Appeals, while favoring the
bill, recommended elimination of the "time of war" exception, noting that
"the exercise of military power in time of war tends to be more arbitrary than
in peacetime," and that the UCMJ had been enacted because of the "unac-
ceptable practices developed during World War II"162-a repetition of which
might possibly be avoided by the requirement of representation of legal coun-
sel. The Chief Judge also stated that "the provision raises a serious question
as to its applicability during a time when Congress has not actually declared
war, as provided in the Constitution."'
16
Section 2 of the bill met with favorable reaction, 64 but, while it was agreed
that such a discharge was just as damaging as a bad conduct discharge, there
was not total support for including the provision as part of the UCMJ.
1 65
The Department of Defense maintains that "there is and should be a clear
separation in the statutes between (1) those provisions which establish the
military judicial system, and (2) laws pertaining to administrative proced-
ures,'166 and, thus, recommends that such procedures should not be incor-
porated in the UCMJ but elsewhere in Title 10 of the United States
Code'
6 7
However, as was pointed out at the hearings,
- Statement of Fred W. Shields, Transcript: 1966 Hearings 884.161 Statement of Edward S. Cogen and Lawrence Spreiser, Transcript: 1966 Hearings 685.
'1 Statement of Chief Judge Quinn, Transcript: 1966 Hearings 378.10 Ibid.
'" For the subcommittee's original conclusions regarding legal counsel and administrative
discharges, see Summary: 1962 Hearings 4-5, 51.
m Statement of Brigadier General William W. Berg, Deputy Ass't Secretary of Defense
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the vice of current administrative elimination procedures is that they eliminate
for misconduct with a concomitant stigma while evading the safeguards that
should accompany elimination for that reason. Once consequence to the indi-
vidual of an elimination for misconduct is kept in mind, it becomes absurd to
prate, as Army officials so often do, that "this is administrative, not crimi-
nal."168
Notwithstanding whether such procedures are "criminal prosecutions" and
within the scope of the sixth amendment, the proposed bill, if passed, will
add further definition to the phrase "right to counsel" in connection with
military personnel. However, just as the differences in the later court deci-
sions indicate that the question of how far the sixth amendment right to
counsel should be extended remains unsettled, the testimony of those who
urge that the proposed bill does not go far enough also indicates that the
question of right to counsel and the military, as far as congressional activity is
concerned, remains unsettled, despite the proposed legislation.
THE PRESENT QUESTIONS
A century and a half have passed since Brigadier General William Hull in-
voked at least the spirit, if not the letter, of the sixth amendment right to
counsel. 169 As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, since the rejection
of General Hull's plea for right to assistance of counsel in a constitutional
sense, much has been done by the Congress and the courts to apply the spirit
of the right to counsel provision to military tribunals-short of direct appli-
cation of the full scope of the provision itself. The discussion also reveals that
exactly what the sixth amendment right to counsel requires as far as the mili-
tary services are concerned is not clearly defined. It is time, then, to return to
the questions posed at the beginning of this discussion.
170
Does the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Apply to Military Tribunals?
Any interested student of the Constitution realizes that raising what at one
time is no more than a theory advocated by a few to the level of constitution-
al doctrine is not an insurmountable problem.' 7 ' While the drafters of the
sixth amendment may not have intended the right to counsel provision to
apply to courts-martial in 1789, it does not necessarily follow that their in-
tention would have been the same for courts-martial in 1966.
1" Statement of Frederick Bernays Wiener, Id. at 630.
'10 Supra note 10.
110While one hesitates to predict what "will" be done, since those without the responsibility
of office too often say what "should" be done, the discussion of the questions will follow an
approach of what "could" be done.
171 E.g., compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) with Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.




"We're under a Constitution," the oft-quoted declaration states, "but the
Constitution is what the judges say it is."172 True, the Constitution may not
have said that an accused before a military tribunal had the right to assist-
ance of counsel at a time when the persons subject to federal military law
were of an exceedingly small number, 73 were volunteers, 174 and were often
regarded as little more than slaves, 7 5 and at a time when the offenses de-
nounced by military law were peculiar to military service itself and not pun-
ishable in common law courts.' 76 Perhaps the Constitution has a slightly dif-
ferent meaning, however, at a time when those subject to federal military
law number in the millions, 177 are serving as a result of involuntary
draft laws,' 78 and can be tried for any crime before a court-martial.
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Consequently, while historical evidence would make it difficult, if not in-
accurate,1 80 to say the original meaning of the Constitution was that the right
to counsel applied to military tribunals, there exist sound constitutional theo-
ries to permit one to say correctly, in view of the vastly changed cir-
cumstances, that the Constitution now means that military personnel, as are
civilians in both state and federal courts,' 8' are guaranteed, either directly or
indirectly, the sixth amendment right to assistance of legally trained counsel.
One theory concerning the protections of the entire Bill of Rights, advo-
cated by Frederick Bernays Wiener, would indirectly apply the sixth amend-
ment protection to military personnel through the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. 8 2 According to Mr. Wiener, the constitutional protections
would be assured for those subject to military justice by "read[ing] into the
due process clause of the fifth amendment the substance of the guarantees
that have been read into the due-process clause of the fourteenth-guaran-
tees whose substance is presently applicable to military persons-and to mark
out a line from case to case with due regard to the actualities of the military
situation." 8 3
"1 This statement was first made by Charles Evans Hughes, then governor of New York,
in a speech before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce, May 3, 1907.
173 See Wiener I at 9. In 1789 the active troops totaled 672; by 1792, although the authorized
total was 5,120, the actual total was only 3,692.
'I Id. at 8 n.47. The first national draft act was not passed until the Civil War. Act of
March 3, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731.
"1 See Wiener II at 293.
171 See Wiener I at 10.
177Id. at 11. As of January 31, 1966, the number of active military personnel totaled
2,899,724. DoD News Release #169-66, March 2, 1966.
7 The Universal Military Training and Service Act was recently amended to extend the
draft until July 1, 1967. Act of March 28, 1963, 77 Stat. 4 (1965); 50 App. U.S.C. 467 (c) (1964).
170 See Wiener I at 11-12.
See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra note 141.
2 Wiener II at 294-304.
Id. at 303. Query whether Judge Christensen's analysis in Application of Stapley, 246 F.
Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965), adopts this approach or whether Stapley embodies a direct appli-
cation of the sixth amendment.
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Precedential support for the flexibility of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment exists in the Supreme Court decision that the equal protec-
tion of the laws clause which textually appears in the fourteenth amendment
is also included in the meaning of due process under the fifth amendment.
18 4
As Wiener points out, his theory "will not involve nearly as great an advance
in constitutional interpretation"' 185 as has other cases, "nor will it encounter
the community opposition which arises when a new doctrine runs ahead of
and in opposition to community mores."'186
Following this theory, then, it could just as easily be concluded that the
due process clause of the fifth amendment requires application of the sixth
amendment right of counsel to military tribunals as it was recently concluded
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires applica-
tion of the sixth amendment right to counsel to the state courts. 187
Finding no quarrel with Mr. Wiener's theory and agreeing that "it is not
doctrinaire liberalism to urge that its [the fifth amendment's] sweep is broad
enough to harden into constitutional bone the gristle of statutory sanctions
that now protects the personnel of our armed services,"'188 it is submitted,
though, that this is not the sole theory under which the protection of right
to counsel for servicemen can be elevated to constitutional dignity.
There is a more direct approach available. A fact noted by Mr. Wiener is
that the right to counsel provision was not declaratory of existing law, as
were other provisions of the Bill of Rights,18 9 but was designed to correct an
existing evil. 90 While many states had rejected the British practice of per-
mitting defense counsel only for persons accused of treason, 19 it is "a fair
summary to conclude that the sixth amendment, insofar as it granted the
right to counsel 'in all criminal prosecutions,' guaranteed for all time a right
only recently won, and that not universally nor in all cases."'
192
At the time of the drafting of the sixth amendment, the right to counsel
provision had the limited meaning only that counsel could speak in court. 93
Since that time, the meaning of right to counsel has been broadened to re-
quire supplying counsel in all cases, federal and state, capital and non-capi-
tal.19 4 Right to counsel means not merely that a defendant must be given an
184 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Wiener II at 299.
meIbid.
1w Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 141.
1 8 Wiener II at 303-304.
'0 Wiener I at 3-4. Trial by petit jury, presentment by grand jury, due process, guarantee
of bail, privilege against self-incrimination, and prohibition against double jeopardy were
well settled in English law.
1 0 Id. at 4.
= Ibid.
"Id. at 5.
' Id. at 4-5. See note 10 supra for the role of counsel in early courts-martial proceedings.
"' See cases cited supra note 141.
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opportunity to have a lawyer appear with him in the courtroom, but that
counsel must be provided for a poor person at a preliminary examination
which is or may be a critical stage of the prosecution, 9 5 and that counsel must
be provided when an investigation shifts from investigatory to accusatory. 196
While it has been submitted that the changes in the interpretation of the
sixth amendment right to counsel reflects an application of the fifth amend-
ment 97 (and thus Mr. Wiener's theory and the one presented herein may be
one and the same thing), the fact remains that no limitations on the defini-
tion yet exist. The expanded definition of right to counsel, as it presently
stands, indicates that it is but a small step forward to expand the definition
to include application of this fundamental right to military personnel to the
extent that it is applied to civilians.
It would seem that there would be little difficulty in resolving the ques-
tion of whether the sixth amendment right to counsel applies to military
tribunals. Under Mr. Wiener's theory of indirect application through
the due process clause of the fifth amendment or according to the theory of
direct application through further definition of the right to counsel provi-
sion of the sixth amendment, it is clear that there exists sound theoretical
basis upon which the constitutional protection of right to assistance of coun-
sel may be provided for the men and women who serve to protect and pre-
serve the Constitution.
Does Right'to Counsel Refer to Legally Trained Counsel?.
Congress has provided for legally qualified counsel at general courts-martial
and for military counsel at special courts-martial. 98 Those courts which have
taken the position that the sixth amendment applies to military tribunals
have consistently held that the right to counsel, where applied to military
tribunals, does not necessarily mean the right to legal counsel.'9 9 The most
recent judicial pronouncement that the sixth amendment right to counsel
applies to special courts-martial concluded that it was "unnecessary to de-
cide whether before such tribunals under all circumstances an accused is en-
titled to be represented by counsel who have been trained and admitted to
practice before a civilian court... -200 There has been no court decision spe-
cifically holding that the sixth amendment, if applied to courts-martial,
would require legal counsel as opposed to military counsel. Whether this
should be the case, then, is unresolved.
15 White v. Maryland, supra note 141.
196 Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 141.
17 FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 34-35 (1949).
-l10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964).
'm E.g., Romero v. Squier, 133 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 785 (1943);
Altmayer v, Sanford, 148 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1945).
Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D. Utah 1965).
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Mr. Justice Sutherland has well stated the necessity for a lawyer to repre-
sent an accused during a criminal proceeding:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not compre-
hend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated lay-
man has small and sometimes no skill in the science of the law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indict-
ment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and con-
victed upon incomplete evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or other-
wise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand
of counsel in every step of the proceedings against him. Without it, though he
not be guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how
to establish his innocence.2 01
Mr. Justice Sutherland's comments refer to civilians; but are they any less
appropriate where military personnel are concerned? The punishment and
loss of benefits meted out by a court-martial are no less real than that by a
civilian court. It is true, however, that under the UCMJ, an accused is pro-
vided with legal counsel when a capital offense is involved, i.e., when the ac-
cused appears before a general court-martial.202 Should not this statutory pro-
tection be given the permanency and strength of a constitutional protection?
An accused is provided with legal counsel when a non-capital offense is in-
volved, i.e., when he appears before a special court-martial, only when the
trial counsel is legal counsel.203 The proposed legislation may alter this if the
punishment to be adjudged is a bad conduct discharge.2 04 Yet, is there any
reason why legal counsel should not also be provided when the punishment
for the non-capital offense is less? Furthermore, the sixth amendment re-
quires that civilians shall have the right to assistance of counsel in all capital
and non-capital cases. 205 If civilians are entitled to legal counsel in all non-
capital cases, why should not a similar right exist for military personnel?
If military law regulated only military offenses, as it did when the Bill of
Rights was first adopted, 206 a stronger argument could be made for limiting
the meaning of counsel to non-legally trained military counsel. However, as
has been noted above,20 7 the UCMJ places no limitations on the type of crime
which can be tried by a court-martial.
While various guidelines are provided for military counsel in assisting an
Powell v. Alabama, supra note 141.
10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 827 (b) (1964).
10 U.S.C. §§ 819, 827 (c) (1964).
2" S. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
Supra note 141.
Supra note 176.
2w Supra note 179.
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accused 208 and while the UCMJ stipulates certain procedural steps to aid the
accused, 20 9 it is still doubtful whether military counsel, no matter how com-
petent in other areas, are sufficiently skilled to adequately defend an accused,
no matter how petty the charge may be, especially when it is not one of a
military nature. Although the UCMJ provides for automatic review of all
courts-martial trials,2 10 the absence of a lawyer at the original proceedings
may reduce the practical value to an accused of this automatic review.
211
In the Culp212 case, Chief Judge Quinn and Judge Ferguson discussed the
qualifications of military counsel and whether legal counsel was desirable.
Chief Judge Quinn defended the qualifications established by Congress and
stressed the automatic review of all courts-martial trials required by the
UCMJ.218
While Judge Ferguson's remarks were in reference to the necessity of legal
counsel when a bad conduct discharge is involved, 214 the objections he stated
apply to military counsel in general. First, the training in military law for a
nonlawyer, being no more than a "general orientation course" and lacking
any "rigorous and intensive process which fits one to become the advocate of
an individual enmeshed in the toils of criminal law," does not provide "the
training required to perform adequately as counsel for an accused."
215
Second, a layman is not necessarily aware of the "ethical responsibilities"
of the legal profession and "will never understand an attorney's devotion to
the interests of an 'obviously guilty' client or the singleminded loyalty to the
latter's cause which almost unexceptionally characterizes the practice of
law." 21 6 A nonlawyer's duty to the Armed Services may take precedence over
his duty to his client, for, as Judge Ferguson stated:
It seems to me well nigh impossible for one untrained both in the law and in
the inviolable standards of the legal profession to put to one side what he might
conceive as his responsibility to the service and devote himself entirely to the in-
terests of an individual whom he may privately think undesirable.
217
Third, Judge Ferguson does not see automatic appellate review as a sub-
stitute for legal counsel.218 As Senator Ervin has pointed out, the review is on
the basis of the entire record, and a nonlawyer may not recognize what evi-
dence or information, which will be beneficial to the accused, should be
Supra note 65.
Supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
- 10 U.S.C. §§ 859-876 (1964).
" InIra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
2 1 United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
2 Id. at 218, 33 C.M.R. at 430. (Quinn, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 219, 33 C.M.R. at 431 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
Ibid.
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placed into the record; consequently, appellate defense counsel can not take
advantage of this information.219 The experience of the Court of Military
Appeals supports Senator Ervin's conclusion, as shown by Judge Ferguson's
statement:
The many guilty pleas which we have reviewed on the basis of skimpy tran-
scripts bear eloquent witness to the cogency of Senator Ervin's comments. How
are we to know the real truth of the matters involved, if the accused, upon the
advice of a nonlawyer, chooses to confess his guilt judicially and nothing is
placed in the record to support the validity of his plea except for a formula
prated from the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951? We can go
only upon the record in measuring its legal sufficiency to support the findings
and sentence. Yet, we are truly ignorant of what might have been done had the
accused's evidence been viewed by an attorney thoroughly versed in the law and
bound by the sanctions of the Canons of Ethics to advise and counsel with his
client in the best traditions of Anglo-American advocacy.
220
It must be remembered, though, that certain charges are peculiar to mili-
tary life, such as disobeying an order or absence without leave, which have
no direct counterpart in civilian life, and that the procedure of a special
court-martial differs from the proceedings in civilian courts. Emphasis is
placed on these factors by Chief Judge Quinn, who states: "An officer's ordi-
nary training and experience, therefore, are reasonably calculated to make
him learned in the simplified procedures and in the substance of the military
type offenses that normally come before such courts."
221
Although there is no direct counterpart in civilian life to the military type
of offense, certain offenses in the nature of traffic violations, public disorder
and the like bear resemblance. As of yet, the right to assistance of counsel has
not been extended to the point where a lawyer must be furnished for civilians
charged with such offenses.222 It would seem, therefore, that there should be
no requirement that legal counsel be provided for military personnel charged
with offenses of a similar nature under military law.
A proposed solution to the problem of whether right to counsel refers to
legally qualified counsel-a solution which perhaps resolves the differences
in approach taken by Chief Judge Quinn and by Judge Ferguson-would be,
in addition to requiring legal counsel where the punishment to be imposed
is of a serious nature and consequence, to require legal counsel for military
personnel in every situation where a lawyer would necessarily be required
if the offense were committed in a civilian setting. When a serviceman is ac-
cused of an offense which, had he committed as a civilian, assistance of coun-
"0 109 CONG. REc. 13354 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1963).
2 United States v. Culp, supra note 212, at 220, 33 C.M.R. at 432 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
m Id. at 217, 33 C.M.R. at 429.
2 See Silverstein, supra note 142, at 1026.
[Vol. XV
Comments
sel would have been provided, there is no justification in denying him such
assistance only for the reason that he is a serviceman. A man is a citizen first,
a soldier second. If the right to counsel-the right to assistance by an attorney
-is a fundamental and essential right under the Constitution necessary for
the fair trial of a civilian, then, indeed, it Would be ironic if this same right
were denied to those who defend the Constitution merely because they have
donned a military uniform.
Can the Constitutional Right to Counsel Be Practically Applied to Military
Tribunals?
Certain objections may be raised to recognizing that the sixth amendment
entitles a serviceman to legally qualified counsel. Among these are-that it
won't work in time of war; that the military services would have difficulty
adjusting to such an extension; that the supply of lawyers is inadequate to
assign legal counsel to all courts-martial proceedings; and that the require-
ment will have a detrimental effect on maintaining discipline and morale.
An examination of these considerations is desirable to ascertain whether the
constitutional right can be effectively, as well as theoretically, applied.
Time of War. This particular consideration may be irrelevant during time
of peace. "[I]t does not seem appropriate today to deprive our young men
in uniform of safeguards we now provide them because those safeguards
might not work well if war should come at some undetermined time." 223 On
the other hand, wartime may be the very time that a serviceman may need
the protection of legal counsel if the offense charged is other than a military
offense for the "exercise of military power in time of war tends to be more
arbitrary than peacetime." 22 4 If the offense is military only, legal counsel may
not be necessarily required.
Whatever the case, it is premature to reject right to counsel for servicemen
as not being required by the sixth amendment simply because the exigencies
of war may affect the right. When martial law is declared and when military
necessity requires, the question of how far the right is affected, if at all, may be
determined.
2 25
Difficulty of Adjustment. As has been seen throughout this discussion, Con-
gress, the courts, and the services themselves have extended the right to coun-
sel to servicemen in many situations, motivated by the desire to provide for
servicemen one of the fundamental safeguards of civilized society. Whatever
difficulties of adjustment were necessitated by such extensions have been suc-
2 Ervin, supra note 138, at 11.
' Supra note 162.
22 Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2 (1866).
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cessfully resolved. 226 Should the situation alter if motivation is replaced by
constitutional direction?
All services are, of course, required to assign legal defense counsel for gen-
eral courts-martial and for special courts-martial when trial counsel is legal
counsel.227 Since the Air Force policy is to assign lawyers to all special courts-
martial, the Air Force should have no difficulty in adjusting to the practice.
Any difficulty the Army might have would be due to the availability of law-
yers, discussed below, but not to the nature of Army operations, which are
confined to the ground and conducted in or near a base complex. The only
service seriously affected by such a requirement would be the Navy, whose
operations make it impractical to assign lawyers to all ships in order to de-
fend an accused while on extended cruises.
228
However, this same problem arises when a serviceman commits an offense
on board ship which would subject him to a general court-martial. Since a
general court-martial cannot be convened without the proper personnel,
2 29
the commanding officer must either confine the accused, or, if it is an extended
cruise and such confinement is impossible or impractical until the ship re-
turns to port, he must be taken off the ship.
Since the Navy has had to cope with these conditions as far as gen-
eral courts-martial are concerned and since proceedings involving a minor
offense or one of a strictly military nature may not necessarily require legal
counsel, the area of difficulty is that which involves an offense which, had it
been committed by a civilian, the accused would be entitled to legal counsel.
If this be the case, the commanding officer could proceed in the same man-
ner as he would with an accused awaiting a general court-martial. It might
be said that this course of argument points toward the complete abolition of
special and summary courts-martial, if not officially, at least in practice. This,
however, is not a novel suggestion, even if true, and has been advanced by
military experts in the past.
23o
Notwithstanding the difficulties of adjustment, Senator Ervin's words, in
reference to the inconveniences of making a lawyer available to a serviceman
threatened with a discharge under conditions other than honorable, are par-
ticularly appropriate to this objection: "However, if the Armed Services dis-
play the same initiative and imagination in confronting this problem that the
m For an example of how the military services have resolved certain adjustment difficulties,
see the description of the Navy's answer to the shortage of court reporters necessitated by the
requirement of 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964) that "a bad-conduct discharge may not be adjudged
unless a complete record of the proceedings and testimony before the court has been made."
Ward, UCMJ-Does It Work, 6 VAND. L. REV. 186, 214 (1953).
10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964).
Cf. Ward, supra note 226, at 187.
10 U.S.C. § 816 (1964).
20 Statement of Seymour W. Wurfel, Professor, Law School, University of North Carolina:
"The enlarged powers now available under non-judicial punishment make it practicable to
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Army has shown in developing its field judiciary system, I believe the diffi-
culties can be surmounted.
'" 231
Supply of Lawyers. As far as the sufficiency or availability of manpower to
implement a constitutional directive to provide legally qualified counsel, the
objections of the military232 are perhaps motivated by objection to the change
in policy rather than by any real difficulty in making lawyers available. As
Judge Christensen noted in Application of Stapley,
[W]ith the increasing personnel in the military service, the rapidity and ease of
transportation and the training facilities and techniques readily available for
specialized training or experience, it is no longer reasonable or necessary, if it
ever were, to deem any officer qualified to act as defense counsel for an ac-
cused merely because he is an officer.
2 33
The Statement of the American Civil Liberties Union at the subcommittee
hearings indicates, perhaps, that the "manpower shortage" argument is a
myth:
We note that some of the proposals prepared by your subcommittee ... un-
doubtedly will dictate the greater utilization of legally trained personnel. To
those who would oppose the proposals or revisions on the ground that the Judge
Advocate components of the various armed services are inadequately staffed
to meet this demand, we would suggest two answers. First, more efficient allo-
cation of existing manpower resources would considerably expand the availa-
bility of legally trained personnel. Thus, Judge Advocates who presently are re-
quired by many commanders to perform totally unskilled jobs, such as taking
of inventories, assignments as club officers or duty officers, and the like, could
be freed from such tasks, and their time could more appropriately be spent in
the performance of legal duties. Second, because current DOD [Department of
Defense] manning requirements have been fully satisfied, many young attorneys
are denied appointments as Judge Advocates and are instead called to active
duty in non-legal capacities. Accordingly, a large reserve of potential military
attorneys remains untapped because of the Defense Department's own person-
nel policies.
eliminate both summary and special court-martial. If the proceeding is in fact "non-judicial"
fine; if it is "judicial" at all, it should be fully judicial in all respects in justice to both sides.
A general court has of course always had jurisdiction to impose the lesser punishment
normally associated with special courts." Transcript: 1966 Hearings 311. See also S. 759, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), which proposes the abolition of summary courts-martial.
"31 Ervin, supra note 138, at 7.
2Brigadier General Kenneth J. Hodson, Ass't Judge Advocate General, United States
Army, stated before the subcommittee that the "additional requirement for legal services"
required by the proposed amendments to the UCMJ "imposes an unacceptable demand on
military manpower sources." Transcript: 1966 Hearings, 55. Unfortunately, there is no sta-
tistical evidence available to indicate exactly how large a demand extending the constitutional
right to counsel to servicemen would make on military manpower sources.
M Supra note 200, at 321.
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Thus, it is our view that there is a sufficient source of legally qualified persons
to implement any legislation designed to safeguard the constitutional rights of
military personnel.
23 4
Maintaining Discipline and Morale. If a commanding officer has no direct
means of disciplining a man who has committed an offense detrimental to the
morale of the unit, and instead, has to refer the offender to a court-martial
removed from the location where the offense is committed in order for the
offender to receive assistance of legal counsel for what might normally be a
purely disciplinary matter, the effect on the remaining men under his com-
mand may be injurious to the commanding officer's stature.23 5 For the ground
forces this would be prevalent in the field. But the problem would be even
greater for a commanding officer of a ship at sea.
This objection, however, can be overcome by a commanding officer's intel-
ligent use of the present provisions of the UCMJ. 236 The offense which will
normally fall within the scope of matters having a debilitating effect on dis-
cipline and morale, if not met with an immediate command remedy,
are those which may be treated under Article 15. Having recently been ex-
panded,23 7 a commanding officer's powers to render immediate punishment
for an offense, when he deems it necessary for the welfare of the unit as a
whole, are carefully laid out and, in effect, are broad in scope.
238
On a ship at sea, punishment may be administered even where the offender
demands a trial by court-martial, 239 if immediate remedy is necessary. Such
broad power is essential for the safety of the ship and is in line with the com-
manding naval officer's traditionally broad "mast powers." 240 The punitive
remedies are clearly defined 241 and the immediate imposition of disciplinary
punishment does not act as a bar to "trial by court-martial for a serious crime
or offense growing out of the same act or omission, and not properly punish-
able under this article." 242 Also, punishment under this article does not
appear as a criminal conviction on the record of the offender. 243 In the case
of ground forces, upon the demand of the accused, he may not be punished
under Article 15, but may receive the proper court-martial. 244 It is, therefore,
Transcript: 1966 Hearings 685.
See generally Ward, supra note 226, at 225-227.
m See 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1964) which deals with non-judicial punishment.
2 Act of September 7, 1963, 76 Stat. 447. See Ward, supra note 226, at 225-227, for an early
plea that the non-judicial powers under the original UCMJ be expanded.
--- 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1964).
21 10 U.S.C. § 815 (a) (1964).
210 Ward, supra note 226, at 226.
- 10 U.S.C. § 815 (b) (1964).
-- 10 U.S.C. § 815 (f) (1964).
243 Note, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
127, 136 n.112 (1964).
"1 10 U.S.C. § 815 (e) (1964).
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submitted that intelligent use of Article 15 by a commanding officer will, in
all situations, meet the objection presented. Just as the UCMJ had no adverse
effect on military discipline and morale, 245 there is no indication that the
extension of the right to counsel would have such an effect.
CONCLUSION
That those responsible for administering military justice and protecting the
rights of military personnel have afforded many basic and fundamental guar-
antees of civilized society to the men and women of the Armed Services is
evident. That, in affording these guarantees, certain practical adjustments
have been necessary is equally evident. However, neither the fact that much
has been done nor the fact that to do more would require further adjustment
offers sufficient justification for failure to afford those who serve to defend
the Constitution an essential right of the Constitution. The right to effective
assistance of legally qualified counsel-guaranteed to all civilians-if denied'
to military personnel, belies the fact that the Constitution protects all citi -
zens. Replacing the flexible legislative and administrative privilege of right
to counsel, legal or non-legal, for servicemen with the permanent constitu-
tional right they enjoyed as civilians bears truth to the fact that "the Consti-
tution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all




Statement of Seymour W. Wurfel, Transcript: 1966 Hearings 330: "I personally don't
think that there has been any substantial deterioration in the overall discipline of the mili-
tary establishment because of the Uniform Code. I would say that its consequences on the
whole have been quite beneficial and my personal evaluation would be that the Code has
not impeded the essential elements of discipline." See also [1960] C.M.A. & JAG ANN. REP. 4.
11 Ex parte Milligan, supra note 225, at 120.
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